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Editorial
JEAN-PIERRE  CABESTAN
What kind of world order does China want? Having become theworld’s second largest economy in 2010, China clearly has ambi-tions to change the international order. The coming to power of
Xi Jinping in late 2012 confirmed this ambition, although most observers of
Chinese foreign policy point to 2008, with the global financial crisis and the
Beijing Olympic Games, as the year of Beijing’s de facto abandonment of the
policy of prudence and of keeping a low-profile (literally “fleeing the light and
seeking the darkness” – taoguang yanghui) promoted by Deng Xiaoping after
the Tiananmen massacre in 1989. (1) The meeting on China’s new diplomacy
organised by Xi in November 2014 openly replaced this motto with a formula
much more in phase with the country’s new power and capabilities: “Strive
for achievement” (fenfa youwei), an expression that can also be translated as
“deploy all your energy” or “be dynamic and full of promise.” (2) In any case,
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) intends from now on to not merely as-
sert its power but also to become a source of initiatives on the international
stage. In other words, to use one of Mao Zedong’s favourite expressions, China
wants to “walk on two legs,” and both legs, as we shall see, are more comple-
mentary than contradictory: to put it simply, one could say that one repre-
sents the stick, and the other the carrot.
To theorists of international relations, China’s power assertiveness and the
rapid strengthening of its military capabilities demonstrate beyond any
doubt that the Beijing leadership as well as large segments of Chinese so-
ciety continue to favour a realistic approach to relations between nation-
states, especially with the other great powers, and above all with the United
States. The impressive popularity of John Mearsheimer’s book (3) in China is
one of the most striking illustrations of this. On the other hand, to support-
ers of the constructivist approach, the integration of the PRC into the world
economy, its active participation in intergovernmental institutions, the
growth of its societal relationships with foreign countries, and the increasing
visibility of its “soft power” attest to the merits of their analysis and to the
need for China not only to accept a higher degree of interdependence with
the international community, but also to take greater advantage of this in-
terdependence in order to defend and promote its national interests. (4)
Obviously, we will not manage in this dossier and in this presentation to
reconcile these two schools. China, like the other major powers, does not
completely assume these two essential aspects of its international action:
it is in this sense somewhat schizophrenic or “autistic,” as Edward Luttwak
puts it. (5) One could go further and argue that this schizophrenia is the ex-
pression of an authoritarian political system that is more “fragmented” than
is commonly believed, torn between quasi-independent baronies equipped
with the institutional or rather the bureaucratic resources to defend their
interests and their patch tooth and nail. Such is the division between ad-
ministrative systems (xitong) in China that everything relies on the capacity
of the regime’s top man, the “Secretary General-President-Commander-in-
Chief,” in other words Xi Jinping, to coordinate and to tell the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) and the whole country which priorities to follow. In this
sense, the centralisation of power in his hands meets the institutional and
policy needs of the People’s Republic while it aims to reach the first division
of great powers, on an equal footing (at least for now) with the US.
This duopoly that does not speak its name is also a new form of bipolar
rivalry, reminiscent in some ways of the high tide of the Cold War and of
US-Soviet tensions. However, times have changed: China has not only
strengthened but also globalised, and combining well-tempered realism
with selective constructivism allows it to now take advantage of the new
asymmetries that have emerged and that are generally, except vis-à-vis the
United States, advantageous to it, in order for it to not only carry more
weight in international relations but also to more clearly influence the rules
of the international game. (6) But even with regard to the US, the Beijing
regime knows how to guard against finding itself in a position of weakness:
this is the well-known “hedging” strategy, used by many countries in the
context of the post-Cold War and of globalisation, including the United
States against China, but it is far more vital for any lesser power in its rela-
tionship with a stronger state. (7)
The question is obviously whether China is willing to settle for reforming
existing standards and international institutions or whether it wishes to
“change everything.” In short, as Françoise Nicolas asks in the first article,
is it reformist or revisionist? One should bear in mind that the PRC, due to
its internal regime but probably also to its strategic tradition, tends to mask
its true intentions. For example, who could have foreseen, even five years
ago, the establishment in 2015 of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
(AIIB), and especially its success? Likewise, what is Beijing’s long-term goal
in the South China Sea? To oust all the other countries that occupy natural
structures there, or to dominate through its sheer relative weight the area
inside the famous nine-dash line, inherited from the eleven-dash line drawn
by Chiang Kai-shek’s regime in 1947?
At the same time, as shown by the contributions in this issue, there is also
a sense that the Chinese government has decided to “walk on two legs”: to
put it simply, on the one hand, to reform from within, by means of its grow-
ing influence, existing norms and institutions; and on the other, to create
new standards and institutions designed to compete with, but also to chal-
lenge and transform from outside, the international order established by
the United States and the West at the end of World War II. In other words,
China is both reformist and revisionist. (8)
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While there seems to be a strong consensus among the official Chinese
elites (politicians and public intellectuals) around this hybrid project, we
perceive durable fault lines both as regards China’s long-term international
objectives and the modus operandi it should favour.
Indeed, beyond this capacity of transformation of the international order,
what is the objective of the People’s Republic? To take the place of the
United States? Everyone agrees that China will sooner or later become the
world’s leading economic power, even if the current slowdown in growth
may extend this timescale. Many Chinese also think, not without reason,
that their country will eventually manage to dominate East Asia, challenging
the privileged strategic role occupied by the Americans since 1945. But does
China really believe it can completely oust the United States from its re-
gional environment? And how many Chinese actually expect that their
country will replace the US as the world’s leading military and political
power? While the realist theory of “power transition” between the dominant
but declining power that is America and the rising power that is the former
Middle Kingdom has many followers in the People’s Republic, one wonders
if this issue does not divide the Chinese more than it unites them. (9)
The evolution of the distribution of powers (the power shift referred to,
for example, by Gaye Christoffersen) does not necessarily equate with a
transition similar to the passing of the torch between the United Kingdom
and the United States at the end of the nineteenth century. In fact, officially,
Xi’s China continues to call for “multipolarity” (duojihua) in international
relations, without always being aware of the capacity of the other poles,
even the secondary ones, to counter its own rise to power. In addition, with
Washington, Beijing has maintained a strategy of avoidance – or delay – of
any direct confrontation, promoting a “new type of relationship between
major powers” (xinxing daguo guanxi ). (10)
However, the debate over China’s ambitions and which policies to favour
is far from over. The recent controversy between Wu Jianmin, former am-
bassador to France and former dean of the University of Diplomacy, and
Hu Xijin, editor-in-chief of Global Times (Huanqiu shibao), highlights the
strong disagreements within the Chinese elite: while Wu defends the virtues
of diplomacy and continues to believe in promoting “friendly” relations with
Western countries and China’s neighbours, and denounces Hu’s “narrow na-
tionalism” (xia’ai de minzuzhuyi), the latter claims greater freedom of
speech to assert his nationalism and endorse the legitimacy of resorting to
war, especially in the South China Sea – if not against the United States,
then at least against the Philippines. (11) But the comments of Wu, who has
clearly become more moderate since he retired, suggest a critique of Xi Jin-
ping’s foreign policy, which he considers to be too aggressive, a source of
unnecessary tensions, and ultimately contrary to the country’s long-term
interests. And shouldn’t we interpret the recent official criticism of the
Global Times as an attempt by the current authorities to address Wu’s con-
cerns and adjust, at least up to a point? (12)
The four papers presented in this special feature do not directly reflect
these tensions. But they show how the current projects of China and its
President are freighted with ambiguity. Indeed, as indicated by Françoise
Nicolas in the first article, the PRC is highly critical of the liberal interna-
tional economic order dominated by the US and Western countries; but at
the same time it has taken full advantage of this order to develop and
emerge to the forefront. In particular, it has enjoyed the largesse of the
World Bank, accepted the recommendations of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), and especially sought, logically enough, and succeeded, as its
economy expanded, in increasing its representation there. Similarly, in 2015,
although still largely non-convertible, the yuan became the fifth interna-
tional reserve currency, a move that is primarily symbolic because the spe-
cial drawing rights (SDRs) are little used (at least for the moment). China
has also made very skilful use of the WTO rules, at the risk of abusing them,
in order to better protect its companies and its market.
However, China’s growing power now allows it to demand more and to
begin to achieve some of its objectives: among them, the questioning and
initially the weakening of Western, and especially American, domination of
the world economic order. The creation of the New Development Bank, the
bank of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in 2014,
and of the AIIB in 2015, are part of this project. In the latter case, it is striking
to observe how China seeks to gain the same privileges as the United States,
which it nonetheless denounces in the case of the IMF (the US maintains a
17.4% share – and veto power – as against China’s 6.4% after reform). In
the AIIB, China (with a 26% share) holds a minority blocking vote, that is
to say a de facto veto, in any major governance decision. In this sense, China
is a revisionist power, but in this case more by imitation of the United States
than by the establishment of a new system of governance. Washington and
Tokyo have since sought to counter or reduce the effects of this initiative
by offering cooperation on projects with the World Bank, and with the Asian
Development Bank, where they respectively continue to exert a major in-
fluence. However, it is clear that, while increasing its influence within ex-
isting institutions, China has the will to create its own institutions, in which
it intends to play a decisive role. In other words, it is doubtful that China
would have given up its AIIB project even if it had achieved a stronger rep-
resentation in the IMF before the end of 2015.
In the field of energy governance, as Gaye Christoffersen shows in the sec-
ond article, China also walks on two legs, and probably even more. On the
one hand, it questions the liberal order and refuses to join the International
Energy Agency (IEA), which is dominated by the developed countries and
especially the United States. On the other, it seeks to establish a new energy
order with the help of the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
(SCO), two entities over which it can claim to have a major influence. How-
ever, this enterprise does not seem promising or realistic. As a result, Beijing
is trying to integrate these projects into its new Silk Road initiative (yidai
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yilu) and especially its “land corridor” component (yidai), while also devel-
oping a dialogue with the IEA and Washington, knowing full well that only
these institutions and bilateral negotiations will contribute to reducing the
global governance deficit in the energy sector. There is obviously an impor-
tant security dimension in the Silk Road strategy: that of reducing its de-
pendence on the Malacca Strait and delivering more oil overland, at the risk
of having to rely on others, such as Pakistan, to improve the security of par-
ticularly volatile regions such as Baluchistan. It is a question for Beijing of
building a new China-centred energy order, not autonomous but integrated
into the global energy governance system.
In the domain of the Internet, we can see a similar deficit of international
institutionalisation. Séverine Arsène points out in the third article that, as
China sees it, the establishment of a new world order in this area involves
better control of the Internet by sovereign states and their stronger partic-
ipation in the elaboration of international rules related to it. China is not
short of allies in this endeavour: all authoritarian or even sovereignist states,
such as China’s quasi ally Russia, favour a clearer and more effective cyber-
sovereignty. As in other areas, including international financial institutions,
China takes deft advantage of mistakes made by the West, such as dereg-
ulation, and of scandals, such as the Snowden affair, to advance its pawns
and justify the censorship and filtering it applies to the Web.
Certainly, Chinese experts have a strong tendency to present the question
of Internet governance in a paranoid manner, as if China were the only one
constantly besieged by cyber-attacks, and also as if, unlike the US, it were
not attacking anyone. Its aim is clearly to justify the restraints it imposes
on access to sites and feeds. However, what is most striking is Beijing’s abil-
ity to make full use of the institutions of the UN system in order to highlight
its concerns and to legitimise them in front of the international community.
In fact, the UN and the International Union of Telecommunications in par-
ticular are the most likely to give China the majority support it seeks. As
Séverine Arsène shows, China is striving to obtain endorsement of a flexible
international law for the Internet, suitable for every national and cultural
context and protective of national sovereignty. In other words, in China’s
view, the regulation of the Internet involves an affirmation and strength-
ening of the sovereignty of each state and inter-state agreements, rather
than the establishment of multi-stakeholder institutions. Even if it were re-
formed, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN) is likely to remain suspect in the eyes of the Chinese authorities
as being outside their sovereign control and in contradiction to any region-
alisation of the Internet. Will China achieve its objectives? As I see it, the
question remains open.
In matters of international public law and the law of the sea in partic-
ular, China demonstrates the same selective approach as in many other
areas. As Sébastien Colin shows in a current affairs article, it applies those
rules that serve its interests and ignores the rest. But how does this make
it different from the US or other major powers, such as India? One can
point out that, unlike Washington, Beijing ratified the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1996. But in contrast to the US ad-
ministration, which claims to apply it in reality, the Chinese government
has expressed reservations, particularly in matters of international arbi-
tration of maritime disputes, and has advanced interpretations that not
only place it in a minority position, but, by considerably extending its
sovereign control over the exclusive economic zones it claims, make it a
recalcitrant and uncooperative member of the international community
in this field.
Finally, what do we learn from these contributions about the foreign policy
of Xi Jinping and that of his successors?
The first conclusion is clear: by various means, such as “entryism” and cir-
cumvention, which is to say, an approach that is sometimes reformist and
sometimes revisionist, China seeks to change the current international order.
To achieve its goals, it uses many resources at its disposal: first, its economic
and financial power, then its diplomatic influence, and finally its military
and naval power in the broad sense, including navy, coast guard, and fishing
boats. The Silk Road initiative, whose objectives are economic, diplomatic,
and geostrategic, is part of this mobilisation capacity. China also exploits
all the international organisations to which it belongs, first and foremost
the United Nations, an organisation whose role, for obvious reasons – the
presence of a majority of non- or only partly democratic states – China
wishes to see expanded (as does Russia), but also those organisations in
which it has a clear predominance, such as the SCO and the BRICS group.
Moreover, China is no longer afraid of multilateralism and feels strong
enough now to play this card even in bodies where it must struggle with
the West, such as the G20, the WTO, or the OECD, the organisation of rich
and democratic countries that it refuses to join but with which it maintains
a sustained dialogue, for example with regard to development aid. One
could add to this development the evolving Chinese approach to climate
change, marked by the agreement signed with President Obama in Beijing
in November 2014 and the Paris Agreement of December 2015. For the first
time, China has made clear commitments to the international commu-
nity. (13)
Nevertheless, despite a cautious easing of its position (for example, its
role with the US and others as mediator in the endless crisis of South
Sudan), the People’s Republic remains largely favourable to a Westphalian
international order and therefore anxious to preserve almost absolute state
sovereignty. This principle is not unrelated to its internal security needs, and
to the survival of the single party regime that presides over what is the
world’s second great power. In this sense, Beijing needs to continue fuelling
its propaganda as well as its international action with a good dose of anti-
Americanism and even anti-Westernism. Does this necessarily mean that
the current Chinese regime seeks to establish a new China-centred inter-
national order, as Feiling Wang (quoted by Gaye Christoffersen) and others
believe?
One can doubt it. Confucianism, the concept of Tianxia (Empire World)
and of tributary states attached to it, the travels of Admiral Zheng He, now
renamed the greatest “pacifist” explorer in history, and even the Legalist
(fajia) renewal are all ideological resources pressed into the service of both
the domestic and international strategies of the PRC. But one cannot imag-
ine China being capable of extending to the whole world the Tianxia it
once imposed on East Asia, which even then was not without long periods
of interruption, weakness, and withdrawal. It is enough to observe the evo-
lution of Japan, India, or even of the Koreas or Indonesia to measure the
limits of Beijing’s ability to recreate a world that is both Westphalian and
China-centred.
This reality points up two major weaknesses of the PRC: on the one hand,
its inability to fully open up to the world, and the consequences that this
paranoia, which is probably partly justified, can have on its ability to inno-
vate and become a fully developed and modernised economy and society;
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and on the other hand, the weakness of its soft power, still too often per-
ceived as an attribute of the state rather than of society. In this sense, as
noted by David Shambaugh in 2013, China is an incomplete great power. (14)
Accordingly, while it has managed to more clearly influence existing insti-
tutions and has begun to create new ones (such as the SCO and the AIIB),
it still has only a relatively limited capacity to issue international standards
and to take part in global governance.
Is this relative weakness, to which we must add the significant slowdown
of the Chinese economy, a source of stability and peace, or rather of insta-
bility or even war? Some analysts, such as Jonathan Holslag, already foresee
an armed conflict between China and Asia. (15) Although in the light of ten-
sions in the South China Sea one cannot completely exclude this hypothesis,
in times of difficulty the Beijing regime has rarely, and probably never, opted
for external adventures. Furthermore, such a decision would run counter to
its own strategy, which consists precisely of advancing on tiptoe, feigning
reformism but actually implementing a revisionist project that does not
speak its name, and placing its Go stones one after another on the world
board (or Goban) in order to remake it more in its own image.
Will China succeed in this endeavour? As this dossier clearly shows,
the outcome of the game does not depend on China alone: it will also
be the result of the foreign and defence policies of its main partners
and neighbours. While they are rather constructivist and eager to bring
China into the international community, they retain, like the United
States and Japan, a healthy dose of realism that can readily be put in
motion if necessary.
z Translated by Michael Black.
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